As I
discussed in my previous posts, I am strongly of the opinion that the absence
of pipeline capacity is not going to be the tool needed to “strangle the oil
sands”. In my opinion the only way to slow, or arrest, the growth of oil sands
capacity is through some combination of government action (placing a
sufficiently high price on carbon) and the market (reducing demand so that prices
remain low enough to make new investment unprofitable). As I have written before,
and will apparently need to repeat here, blocking Energy East does neither of
these two things. All blocking the development of Energy East will do is to
increase the amount of oil shipped by rail because given the current
combination of oil prices; installed capacity; capacity under construction; and
absence of carbon pricing, virtually all of the existing and most of the
partially completed oil sands installations are still going to be completed.
Given this reality, the output from those facilities is going to be transported
to market by one means or another and in the absence of pipelines that load
will be carried by rail. As I have pointed out more times than I care to
mention on this blog, oil-by-rail is one of the riskiest, least environmentally
sound, ways of getting that crude to market in a Canadian context.
So I have
made some pretty definitive statements above and I suppose it is time for me to
provide my supporting rationale. In my opinion, the linchpin of the Pembina
report is the importance it places on the presence/absence of the Energy East
pipeline on the future development of the oil sands. The money quotes from the
report appear on pages 5-6 specifically:
“Pipeline capacity is a
key determinant of oilsands growth, in addition to operating and capital cost
increases and the market price for oilsands crude”.
and
Because of the Energy
East pipeline’s proposed capacity of 1.1 mbpd [million barrels per day], it
could play a significant role in determining how much and how fast the oilsands
sector expands. Conversely, uncertainty about — or constraints on — the future
availability of low-cost crude transportation acts as a brake on oilsands expansion,
as current production has nearly reached the limit of existing pipeline
capacity.
The problem
with these quotations, and the supplementary assumptions that depend on these
quotations, is that the data supporting the statements are entirely lacking. The
reference for the first quotation is a report in Alberta Oil by Jeff Lewis (ref).
Now I have read the Lewis article several times and I am afraid that for the
life of me I cannot see the line they claim to be citing. Rather the Alberta
Oil article points out the heavy competition that the Canadian oil sands face
with respect to exports to the United States. While the article discusses the
transportation of oil, the emphasis is on the risk to the expansion of pipelines
network because American supply and its effect on Canadian oil prices. It makes
no claim that pipeline capacity is a key but only suggests that capacity,
including pipeline capacity, will be a limiting factor. This is an important
qualifier as will be discussed later.
The second quotation
feeds into an inset text box titled “Moving Crude by Rail”. This text box
appears to be intended to provide the critical support for the entire premise
of the section which, as noted above, provides the support for much of the
later reasoning in the report. The problem with the text box is that it appears
to misinterpret its source material: the Canadian Association of Petroleum
Producers report: “Crude
Oil Forecasts, Markets & Transportation”. In the Pembina report they note
that oil-by-rail was approximately 200,000 barrels per day (bpd) in late 2013. The
Pembina Report appears to indicate that the CAPP report identifies a limit on
rail capacity of 700,000 bpd in 2016 (500,000 bpd more than in 2003). But the
problem is that the CAPP report (on page 32) clearly indicates that the 700,000
bpd limit is not contingent on limits in rail capacity but rather on a number
of features including “the pace of pipeline capacity”. Rather, the CAPP report clearly indicates (in
both the table and figure on page 32) that current oil-by-rail capacity is
around 1 million bpd and is readily expandable to 1.4 million bpd. This 1.4
million bpd greatly exceeds the Energy East capacity of 1 .1 million bpd. The
CAPP document also is limited in that it only describes the Canadian situation
and does not include US oil by rail capacity.
As I have
mentioned several times at this blog, at this very moment the US is expanding
its oil-by-rail capacity immediately south of the border in order to transport over
800,000 bpd of Bakken Crude to the US West Coast. As I have written repeatedly,
part of this upgrade is to supply the approximately 725,000 bpd needed by the
existing US Puget Sound refineries now that their historical Alaskan supply is
drying up. As we all know, the Bakken fields are slowly diminishing in production
(ref).
As their production diminishes this will open up that US oil-by-rail capacity (and
the Puget Sound market) just as it is needed by the oil sands producers. So
what does this all mean? Well the entire basis of the Pembina Report is that by
stalling/Energy East it may be possible to strangle the oil sands, but as I
have noted above, in the absence of Energy East the current and planned oil-by-rail
capacity in Canada alone can more than replace the capacity provided by Energy
East. Moreover, the built-up US capacity will be coming available just when it
is needed by the oil sands producers for future developments.
So let’s go
back to the original premise of this article. What will it take to slow the
growth of the oil sands? Well one again I have to direct you to the article by
Dr. Andrew Leach in Macleans.
Given the money already invested, either in existing or projects with existing
steel in the ground, these projects are going to go forward. Too much money has
been invested to simply abandon these facilities and as described in the
Macleans article most can continue to generate healthy profits even in the
lower price oil markets of today. Given these facts, the only way to limit the
growth of the oil sands is on the demand side. This has to be done by putting a
price on carbon and providing cheaper alternatives to fossil fuels, because the
only thing that can stop to the development of the oil sands is the combined
might of government regulation and the market.
So to
reiterate my original point, Energy East is not some magic key that can be used
to slow the growth of the oil sands. Rather it represents the safest way to
transport existing and already under development capacity to the Canadian
market. As I have written more times than I care to count, with respect to
potential risks to human and environmental health, getting crude oil out of trains
and into pipelines is the safest way to go. Even from a greenhouse gas
perspective, it uses less energy to transport oil by pipeline than it does by
rail. So if you really care about the environment you will stop trying to use these
types of harmful half-measures to slow the growth of the oil sands. I know
fighting Energy East makes for great sound-bites and will no doubt bring in
lots of donations to activist groups and keep lots of activists employed; but
it will do nothing to slow the growth of the oil sands. Moreover if we force
the future oil sands production out of pipelines and into trains it will result
in more rail spills, more polluted watersheds and more potential deaths
Chemist, I have a present for you, the USA Energy Information Agency's 2015 Energy Outlook report:
ReplyDeletehttp://www.eia.gov/forecasts/AEO/pdf/0383(2015).pdf
Go to page 89, Table A21. It shows what the agency forecasts for Canadian production. It shows Canadian oil production rising relentlessly to what I think may be an excessive rate (I'm in the oil business, but I recognize excessive oil production can strengthen the Canadian $ to such an extent that areas outside the oil producing regions may suffer). If I were the Canadian government I would prepare a national energy strategy and cap production at 5 million barrels per day. But the safe transport of all this crude would evidently be done by pipeline. I also believe upgrading the crude to a syncrude with good cleanup properties is the best long term option, because the export stream is a value added product rather than a raw stream. I also want to repeat the previous comment, that a non destructive technology to upgrade and make a syncrude ought to be used. Non destructive means the process hydrogenates the heavy molecules instead of making coke. This is feasible, the technology is marketed, it's expensive but it is economically viable.
If there's a concern over the CO2 emissions the offset could be a triplet of nuclear plants to generate the required heat in cogen mode. It works. Canada has over 50 years of oil reserves it can produce and export, and it really needs to have a long term view.
Note: The report was issued on April 15.